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AUTHORITY

AGO, D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1980


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (2 Mar 73) DAMO-ODU

15 March 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: LTC John L. Keefe, Jr., Deputy
Province Senior Advisor, Chau Doc Province, 14 July 1971 -
13 February 1973

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
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1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Report (U),
2 July 1971.
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of, LTC John L. Keefe, Jr.,
subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized
from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not
be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or
of any agency of the Department of the Army.
4. Information of action initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as
a result of subject report should be provided to the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Military Operations, ATTN: DAMO-ODU within 90 days of
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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Incl
as

Verne L. Bowers
VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General



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(Continued on page 2)

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HEADQUARTERS
ADVISORY TEAM 64 (CHAU DOC PROVINCE)
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96215

MACDR-64

28 January 1973


SUBJECT: AFRIS Province Senior Advisor Completion of Tour Report
(RCS MACCORDS 174.03) LTC John L. Keefe, Jr., [REDACTED]

PII Redacted

THRU : DEPCORDS
Delta Regional Assistance Command
APO 96215

TO : HQ, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACCORDS (AC of Staff, CORDS)
APO 96222

Attached is my completion of tour report for the period 14 July 1971
to 13 February 1973.


JOHN L. KEEFE, JR.
LTC, INF
Deputy Province Senior Advisor

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SECTION I

NAME: KEEFE, JOHN L. JR.

GRADE: Lieutenant Colonel

PII Redacted

SSAN: [REDACTED]

BRANCH OF SERVICE: Infantry

PROVINCE: Chau Doc

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 14 July 1971 13 February 1973

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 13 February 1973

PREVIOUS TOUR IN VIETNAM (DATES-INCLUSIVE): Aug 1965 - June 1966

ASSIGNMENT OF PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR: Company Commander
Co D, 1st Bn, 8th Cav
1st Cav Div (Airmobile).

SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position? 15 years experience as a Combat Arms Officer. A previous tour in Vietnam.
2. What training did you have for this position? PSA course, Vietnam Training Center, Foreign Service Institute.
3. What additional training would you suggest for your position? A complete (extended) course in the Vietnamese language or elimination of language training entirely. I feel a 3-level of proficiency on a scale of 5, prior to entry in country, is essential if an advisor is to derive benefit from language training.
4. What should be the length of tour for your position? A minimum of 2 years.
5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not specify deficiencies.

Operationally, yes. Logistically and administratively, no. The support provided the supported from the supporting was primarily in the form of telling the supported how to support themselves. This was true in the areas of reassignment, leave and R&R orders, rations, funds, and repair of equipment. It resulted in an exorbitant number of advisory man-hours being lost to team support.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones? No. No. Not applicable.
7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

Recommend updating the directive so that it will be consonant with current requirements, objectives, and capabilities. Higher Hqs did not study the many reports regularly submitted, and thus sent out special, numerous "one-timers" which could have been avoided if the reports staffs mined and massaged what was already submitted in another form.

8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification Program? The system is set-up properly to adequately measure progress; however, in many cases the data does not sufficiently portray reality. For example, TFES & TFARS have been consistently a case of "garbage in, garbage out" during my tour.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received.

Yes, clear but not always cogent.

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10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:
- a. Land Reform.
 - b. Public Safety.
 - c. War Victims.
11. The most effective para military forces are:
- a. RSDF.
 - b. National Police
 - c. RD Cadre.
12. The most successful pacification programs are:
- a. Land Reform.
 - b. Local Revenue Improvement.
 - c. RF/PF.
13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:
- a. RF/PF.
 - b. Land Reform.
 - c. Local Revenue Improvement.
14. The least successful pacification programs are:
- a. People's Organizations.
 - b. National Police.
 - c. Youth Affairs.
15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:
- a. Ethnic Minorities (Cambodian Affairs).
 - b. Youth Affairs.
 - c. People's Organizations.
16. The rural people (are) aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making.
17. The people are (more) committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

Principally, a feeling of progress and development in association with the GVN as compared to idle promises on the side of the VC, has created greater commitment to the former. However, it is still a case of favoring the lesser of two evils. Corruption among GVN officials and its consequent compromise of their leadership is still rampant and the people suffer at the profit of those professing to lead them toward democracy and a bright future.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and development of Vietnam? (No) If not, what change in the plan should be made?

The plan in many areas is too abstruse and frequently sets unrealistic goals. Provinces are required to cover areas in their plans for which they have neither resources nor control (Communication and PTT), the control resting with the central government. Often times, goals are much too ambitious (PSDF. Quantity is sought at the expense of quality) and in some cases border on the ridiculous (Eradication of Social Evils. Too many prominent military, police and civil officials profit from "social evils" and have no intention of permitting their effective elimination. For the GVN to imply that it is eradicating social evils is pure hypocrisy and the plan is a waste of the paper upon which it is written).

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart? If not, how can this be accomplished?

Yes, However there was insufficient time for planning and evaluation prior to submission of the province plan.

TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PF.

During my entire tour the upgrading of Sector territorial forces has been a major advisory undertaking. In July 1971 Regional Forces consisted of 48 companies of which 20 companies were formed into one mobile battalion and 4 company groups (Lien Doi); at the time there were 236 Popular Force (PF) platoons. By means of conversion of PF spaces to RF, the sector combat units now consist of 67 RF companies of which 52 are formed into 9 mobile battalions and 4 Lien Doi; 154 PF platoons remain. In addition, 1 Sector Tactical Command Post Hq was formed and employed. This force restructuring has significantly added to the flexibility of the sector commander and has greatly increased the mobility of the territorials. The conversion was made possible by the rapid increase in security in eastern Chau Doc permitting a shift of security responsibilities from PF to National Police and PSDF in more secure areas. Consequently, a quantum jump in command and control of territorial forces was possible. In spite of this, there exists a continuous problem of identifying tactical command responsibilities and the specific functions the commander of the STCP and the subsectors are to perform. When operations are jointly undertaken by regular ARVN units and territorial forces, use is made of complicated command and control arrangements and on oftentimes non-existent cooperation in lieu of unity of command. Yet on the positive side, the upgrading of the sector force structure has realized a substantial increase of territorial forces in western Tinh Bien District (the Panhandle). Where only one RF company was assigned to that area over a year ago, there are now 5 RF companies, 2 lien doi headquarters,

6 new operating bases and 3 additional PF platoons. These forces are deployed primarily to secure the population; however, they provide some defense in depth against infiltration. As a result of their anti-infiltration role, the redeployment of these forces has contributed markedly to the security of the province and the Delta as a whole as evidenced by numerous successful ambushes against NVA forces moving south from Cambodia into the tram forest.

As a result of over commitment of Chi Lang National Training Center, in-place training has been of prime importance. Yet it has been ineffective, primarily owing to lack of adequate command supervision at all levels. Junior officers are reluctant to conduct in-place training for their units as prescribed by JGS unless they are pressured into doing so by their superiors and far too often higher commanders are unwilling to or unconcerned about "turning the screws". Much of what was accomplished in this regard in the past was at the constant prodding and checking by US advisors. With the drawdown of US advisory strength there has been a commensurate decrease in attentiveness to in-place training.

The amount of field artillery provided to the Sector has been sufficient in numbers of 105 and 155 howitzer platoons. Through efficient employment, the coverage has been excellent and Sector Artillery can effectively reinforce threatened areas or influence the action by displacing tubes in order to mass fires. However, complicated fire coordination procedures resulting from poorly defined command lines imposed by higher commanders and absence of responsive fire-support communication is an existing problem. Ranger and Corps artillery units located in the Sector frequently are guilty of little or no coordination with Sector artillery. In an attempt to improve the situation and to maximize artillery responsiveness, this advisory team has recommended organizing the artillery so that all artillery units located within the Sector will be OPCON to the Sector Arty Commander in the formation of a Sector Arty Bn. The plan provides for much improved fire-support coordination and considerably more effective and efficient use of fire support means and is considered entirely feasible because of the general static employment of artillery platoons throughout the Delta. Whether or not it will be adopted remains to be seen; but since the plan calls for a reduction in command berths, many useless but influential officers will probably (successfully) oppose it.

The Sector Logistical Support Center (SLSC) has continued to improve over the past 18 months and it contains the expertise and the machinery to perform credibly. However, the same cannot be said of the logistical capabilities of subordinate units. Battalions and companies often times are not in timely receipt of supplies because they do not submit proper paperwork. Frequently, incorrect paperwork is ignored by the receiving agency because it was not submitted in accordance with existing regulations by the requestor; instead of correcting the requestor, nothing is done and the requesting unit assumes it will receive supplies that will not be forthcoming. Much of this can be easily corrected by increased training of unit supply NCO's, teaching inspections of combat units and

lower to higher commander advisory of existing problems (subordinates are very reluctant to bring problems to the attention of superiors that require action by the superior in order to achieve resolution). Additionally, ever present command supervision is required to improve lax practices in supply economy.

In comparison to his adversary, the territorial force soldier is better trained, better fed, better equipped and has a virtually limitless resupply of ammunition. These mixed with aggressive leadership would indeed make him a formidable fighting soldier. This is seldom the case since such leadership is sadly lacking in territorial force commanders. This greatest of all shortcomings stems from selection of leaders from the wealthy and the politically influential rather than from those who have demonstrated competence in command. Greatly compounding this is corruption which appears to permeate all levels of Vietnamese society and every GVN agency. When punitive action against subordinate commanders is warranted, commanders have placed themselves in compromising positions because of patronage and collusion so that cowardly conduct and slipshod performance go unchallenged. The few times that commanders are relieved, they are frequently placed into positions of greater responsibility, i.e., a lackluster, dishonest and cowardly battalion commander was relieved of his battalion command for incompetence and made a district chief. Another great obstacle to aggressive leadership is the failure of the military hierarchy to permit other than token officer promotions from the field. Time after time I have seen the shortage of officers and NCO's surfaced as a problem to learn again that the solution addressed only the NCO shortfall; never a mention of commissioning NCO's who have amply demonstrated their leadership on the battlefield. Frankly, and unfortunately, I believe that it is too late in the game to influence a change through advisory efforts. Hopefully, Vietnamese in high positions of authority will eventually recognize the need for change and take ruthless corrective action.

PSDF.

The performance of the PSDF has been poor to excellent. In the eastern half of the province where security is best, the Hoa Hao predominate, and territorial force strength is limited, the PSDF have usually conducted themselves well in encounters with the VC. They have been inculcated with the idea that their homes are theirs to protect and that the land is Hoa Hao, not communist land. The eastern part of the province is prosperous and the PSDF feel they have a stake there. In western Chau Doc, an ethnically Cambodian, non-VN integrated and illiterate population and the rugged Seven Mountains long a haven for NVA/VC forces, predominate. Here the territorial forces have shouldered the heaviest burden of providing security and here, especially in Tri Ton District, the performance of the PSDF has been marginal with relatively few bright instances of achievement and several instances of treachery. Overall, the PSDF has been a complicated organization oriented toward participation of all sexes and age groups exclusive of draft eligibles. Quantitative rather than qualitative

achievement has been stressed. I feel that the PSDF would be a far better and more manageable organization if it consisted solely of combat PSDF (KITS). The women and children's groups that are mere figures on a chart should be eliminated, and to enhance the combat teams, military men reaching age 40 should be voluntarily released from active duty and used to form the basis of PSDF leadership. Additionally, established training goals should be revised in recognition that PSDF members do not receive pay for their services and must work at civilian jobs to make a living for themselves and their families. In this regard, a 50% reduction in leader training goals is in order.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE.

The 412 Field Police Company is well trained on a regular basis and has a good commander who frequently inspects his six platoons to insure that operations are properly conducted and that in-service and on-the-job training are performed as prescribed. The platoons are actively engaged on Phung Hoang operations in each of the districts and have achieved credible results in apprehension and neutralization of VCI, particularly during the F-6 campaign, and have been a very effective force in the apprehension of draft evaders and deserters. However, VCI eliminations have been primarily the result of non-targeted sweep operations rather than oriented on specific targets arrived at from information received from the Police Special Branch and other province intelligence agencies. With advisory impetus this situation has been improving. Another deficiency has been the reluctance of the district police chiefs to employ the Field Police on patrols in less secure areas when they are not engaged in operations.

NATIONAL POLICE.

When compared with the tremendous amount of effort, money, planning and equipment expended on the National Police Program, the returns in Chau Doc have not been correspondingly great. I believe much of this can be attributed to the performance (or lack of it) of an incompetent acting police chief who was permitted to hold that office for one year in spite of constant advisory pressure and repeated requests of the Province Chief for his removal. A captain, he lacked both the rank commensurate with his responsibilities and the necessary expertise for the job. It was not until September of last year that he was replaced by a lieutenant colonel who reportedly had paid 13,000,000 piasters for the position. Over the last 18 months the police have been pushed out into the province's 57 villages so that their profile is now considerably more evident than in July 1971. Construction of village police stations has progressed at a good rate and there are stations or allotted space in buildings virtually in all villages. In spite of this they have yet to establish themselves as the symbol of protection and law enforcement for which they were created. Surveys taken early and late in 1972 reflect that most people look upon the police solely as apprehenders of draft dodgers and deserters. It is the consensus that village officials, religious leaders and Lower House Deputies respond more

favorably to crime reports than do the police. The surveys indicate a general feeling that the National Police are ineffective. Foot patrols appear to be effectual only in the province capital and the district towns. Traffic control is virtually nonexistent with the only rule of the road being "the largest vehicle has the right of way"; no attempt is made to slow traffic in built-up areas and over-loaded vehicles pass through traffic check points for a mere 200\$VN. Police have assumed some responsibility for security in the 3 eastern districts, however PSDF are more heavily relied upon in that area because officials have greater confidence in them. Since the police were directed and began to use the Province Maintenance Shop, maintenance procedures have improved considerably as has repair of vehicles. Cross border smuggling and the Mekong and Bassac Rivers traffic in narcotics (downstream) and pharmaceuticals (upstream) goes on unimpeded by National and Marine Police and the military, obviously to the great profit of many government officials and certainly the police. Additionally, only token police seizure of contraband military items, such as gasoline, clothing and foodstuffs are made as open sale of such items in large quantities continues unchecked throughout the province. The Correction Center in this province is a model to be compared with any in Vietnam. Unscheduled inspections are welcomed. Inmates are well cared for and receive excellent training in various trades and the illiterate are taught to read and write, all to better prepare them for release. However, overcrowding of this facility has become a continuing problem since inception of the F-6 Campaign. Corrective action in getting the National Police to perform their basic function of law enforcement can be brought about only by honest and capable leadership. The police command suffers the same leadership deficiencies as the military and for the very same reasons as stated previously under RF/PF. Additionally the majority of police are in the force to avoid the war, not to contribute to an orderly society under a rule of law.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT.

This program received considerable advisory help and much of its success is attributable to the Filipino Community Development Officer and his 12 assistants that worked closely with it since its inception. Additionally RD Cadre were tasked with assisting Village Chiefs to organize Peoples Common Activities Groups and to hold village assemblies; the RD Cadres contributed much to the program in this regard and seem intent upon doing a good job for 1972, their first year as sponsors of the program. All projects through 1971 have been completed and the 1972 projects are well underway now that the water level has considerably decreased. Only 4 villages do not have approved projects under the program, a result of incompetent village administration. The people have come to understand how they profit by obligating funds to the Rural Development Credit Program, but still seem to lack interest in inter-village projects (only 1 in the entire province for 1972).

RD CADRE.

The RD Cadre have turned in credible results in their capacity as technical and administrative assistants to the Village Chiefs and staffs. When the scope of their activities was broadened in 1972 to include Village Self Development and Postal Service, the results continued to be encouraging. Tasking them with responsibility for these two programs was a wise decision; familiarity and rapport had already been established with village administrators and the people and the cadresmen had developed a sense of belonging to the communities in which they worked and a desire to see improvement in those areas. As a bonus, handling the mails has brought them closer to the people permitting them constant access to enemy information, understanding of the true needs and aspirations of the populace, and the ability to act as agents of the VIS at the village level with wide face to face contact. In view of reductions in cadre strength, additional levies on their time, such as HES reporting, may result in diminishing returns because of overtaxing their current capabilities.

ETHNIC MINORITIES.

The only legally recognized ethnic minority, Cham-Malays (2% of population), have received considerable help from the Ethnic Minorities Service and the STRD Cadre. The Service, in spite of greatly limited resources and manpower, has been showing steady progress in meeting its CDELD goals. It has put much effort into establishing STRD taught schools in many of the Cham Hamlets as well as establishing rice demonstration plots and sheep raising trial farms in an effort to improve the educational and economic standards of the Cham Malays. The personnel appear genuinely interested in the welfare of the people and are working to get this minority more involved in national aspects of the society outside of their own hamlet. On the other hand, the ethnic Cambodians that make up 15 percent of the population receive little in the way of material and administrative assistance through the Cambodian Affairs Service (CAS). The Chief is weak and unwilling to push for development in Tri Ton District where the majority of the Cambodians have their homes. This coupled with the fact that the political and economic arenas of the province are located in the eastern districts and draw virtually all the community development attention makes the CAS one of the poorest performing services in the province. Only by assignment of a strong willed, knowledgeable and interested CAS Chief who has the active support of the Central and provincial governments can this program begin to improve the lot of some 75,000 poor, illiterate and abused Khmer Vietnamese.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

Development in Chau Doc has been somewhat retarded by a lack of good leadership and quality administration at the village level. Normally, elected and appointed village officials are not the most qualified. Many hold their positions as a result of political, ethnic, religious or monetary influence. They have little education and lack administrative skills

and foresight; however, training programs and time in the job are helping to overcome these shortcomings. Village administration suffered from existing vacancies in village councils and hamlet management boards but Decree 120 has helped this problem greatly by reducing the number of authorized positions thereby permitting retention of the more qualified officials. Additionally, local government suffers from the reluctance of village and hamlet chiefs to relegate authority resulting in too great a workload on a few with consequent poor results. In order to improve local government, laws should be amended to limit the age of qualified village council members from 21 to 60 years and to require a minimum level of education, i.e. 8 years of formal schooling. The Prime Minister or Minister of the Interior should urge recruitment of qualified personnel from any village in the district or province to fill appointed positions. PMAT and training course instructors must impress upon key officials the need for delegation of authority and responsibility. Lastly, the hamlet government should be eliminated. It is unnecessary and only adds to bureaucratic redtape. Village officials can and should maintain liaison with the hamlet population through elders, notables and the people themselves, as well as the elected council members at village level who have a constituency in the hamlet.

AID IN KIND

AIK funds have been useful as an advisory lever as a means of obtaining high impact on selected projects. They should never be used as a crutch permitting the Vietnamese to circumvent established budgetary procedures; and at this point in time such monies should be incorporated into the Vietnamese budgetary system.

SOCIAL WELFARE

The Province Social Welfare Service continues to demonstrate responsiveness in aiding war and natural disaster victims. As soon as an incident occurs, the Village SW Commissioners are on the spot preparing namelists and noting damages and usually reports are expedited through channels so that funds can be distributed in a timely manner. On the other hand, SWS is still reluctant to provide more than minimum support to RTV development projects; normally this limited support is accomplished only after great urging by province advisors. This is much a consequence of limited manpower and expertise for this end of the program. As a possible solution to the problem, MSW could continue to manage funding and acceptance of RTV projects and another agency such as FPDC could be tasked with managing their implementation. The Service Chief and his subordinates are dedicated and respond well to advisory suggestions. With relief in the RTV area, the SWS could be one of the strongest in the province.

CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

Considering the few Hoi Chanh now being received by the Chieu Hoi Center, the facility should be closed in the interest of economy of material

and manpower resources. Future ralliers should be processed by the Regional Chieu Hoi Center.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

REPORT REQUIREMENTS.

The reduction in reporting requirements has been far slower than the reduction in personnel available to prepare the reports. The advisory team has been able to meet suspense dates and provide valid data; however, in pursuit of vast amounts of information and analysis, we have been forced by higher headquarter farther and farther away from the advisory role and closer to the role of monitors. There have been several shortfuzo one-time reports specifying assessments that did not receive justice because the time to gather required detail was not available. Much information requested is already available at higher headquarter in other US reports or from GVN sources.

REPORT FEEDBACK.

Report feedback was overwhelming. Eighty percent of the feedback was of little or no use to the team effort but had to be read to insure that it did not contain new requirements and suspense dates. Much valuable time would be saved by insuring that only absolutely mission essential compiled reports be fcd back to the province teams.

PHUNG HOANG DIRECTORATE

Under SOP 3, Phung Hoang operations were characterized by a long and aggravatingly slow process of learning VCI tactics, targeting and modus operandi and was largely a consequence of considerable personnel turbulence in key positions. Nevertheless, by April 1972 the PLOCC/DIOCCs were conducting reasonably good operations against the infrastructure. However, most of the newly acquired expertise was lost when the program became a National Police responsibility under the guiso of Protection of the People Against Terrorism. New police operatives were school trained but lacked the practical experience so necessary to conduct of effective operations. Since implementation of the specifics of SOP 4, reorganization of the program has been completed. All villages, districts and province have functioning POCs, however restructuring is in order to better distribute the workload, provide for more free exchange of information and enhance coordination. During the past 18 months quantity rather than quality of operations and results has been the rule. Specific targeting has been relatively rare whereas cordon and search operations in areas with low HES ratings have predominated with random neutralizations. Organization of an effective People's Intelligence Net has always been a high priority objective, yet one has never really been established. Failure to make it the direct responsibility of a specific agency is the prime reason attributed to lack of accomplishment in this regard. Since it is experienced and capable of organizing and directing such a net, the Police Special Branch is the likely candidate for this operation. The F-6 campaign, the brain child of the

current Chau Doc Province Chief, was quite successful in seriously crippling the VCI commo liaison. However, it did point up serious drawbacks to Phung Noang operations. As pacification research teams and other sources have revealed, police and other government officials abused the F-6 campaign and other Phung Hoang activities by using them as a threat to the population in order to extort money. Too, known VCI that could afford the ransom (VC An Giang Province Committee has established a special fund for the purpose), were released without question to continue activities in support of the communists. Finally, at times the program was used as a means of settling personal vendettas. Until government heads at all levels want to fully support the Phung Hoang Program and police it within as well as without, it will never succeed in its goal of destroying the VC infrastructure.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PUBLIC HEALTH.

In the past year and a half the Public Health Service has made good progress toward self sufficiency and improved facilities at the district and provincial level, especially in the case of the province hospital where a TB ward and an out-patient clinic are now in operation. Well trained doctors (though few) and technicians and improved supply procedures have contributed to the gains in this respect. However, outlying areas, particularly in Tinh Bien and Tri Ton Districts have not maintained the pace. These locales suffer from shortages of qualified medical personnel and adequate supplies which are attributed to their remoteness, relatively poorer security and ethnic population (largely Cambodian).

EDUCATION.

The development of a system of hamlet/village schools continues at a steady rate and with acceptable results. However, qualified teachers are in short supply in depressed and isolated areas such as Tri Ton District. Tri Ton has a crying need for Cambodian speaking teachers but cannot fill teacher vacancies because teacher standards are currently too demanding. Lowering the education requirements in ethnically Khmer areas would do much to alleviate the teacher problem in Tri Ton and motivation in the form of better pay, housing and training would do much to induce qualified teachers to leave the cities and district towns to fill vacancies in the remote and depressed villages.

PUBLIC WORKS.

Public Works is one of the exceptionally fine services in the province. The Chief is highly competent, dedicated to job accomplishment and manages his resources with maximum efficiency. The development projects for Chau Doc during the 71 and 72 pacification years have been primarily and soundly oriented toward improvement of existing roadways and canals rather than on new construction. Much road repair has been

realized through tasking of the RF Road Repair Company that received great attention from the US Engineer Advisor. Considering the limited equipment, materials, and funds available the results of PW efforts have been quite satisfactory. Much more needs to and can be done at the province level, however, the required means are lacking. The tremendous amount of work on critically needed projects suffers from or is currently impossible because of critical shortages of engineer construction equipment and good and sufficient materials; repair parts are non-existent in Vietnam and must be ordered from other countries consuming an inordinate amount of time; numerous requests are tied up or lost in inefficient channeling systems; and, too little money is available to cover the huge quantity of work required. These problems will only be resolved by attention of higher authority.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & DOMESTIC PRODUCTION.

Generally the economy of Chau Doc is rapidly expanding. With the introduction of sorghum, land previously left fallow after the floating rice season will provide the majority of farmers with a second crop. Rice production with new varieties, irrigation and fertilizers has been increasing steadily. Although there are no major industrial enterprises, cottage industry such as brick kilns, sawmills, bakeries, nuoc mam factories, rice mills, etc., is booming. However, the potential for quarrying of an excellent granite type rock has hardly been tapped and undertaking of a much greater output in this area would be a tremendous stimulus for improvement in routes of communication. More and better roads and docking facilities are a must for creation of a fast transport system if economic capacity is to be realized. Specifically, the economy of the province must be viewed from 2 directions. The great prosperity has been taking place only in the 3 eastern districts and partially in the eastern portion of Tinh Bien (D). In Tri Ton (D) and the Tinh-Bien panhandle, economic development has been stymied by isolation and deficiencies in security, leadership, education, potential and desire to take a business risk. Other inhibiting factors are the language barrier (Cambodian) and ethnic and political discrimination.

LAND REFORM.

This program has received as much advisory attention as any pacification program in Chau Doc save only RF/PF Improvement. Land distribution has been progressing at a steady, if not colossal, rate and as of 31 Dec 72 there were better than 450 percent (from 10,217 to 46,327) more land owners than when the program began in 1970 and 85 percent of the 78,100 hectare cumulative distribution goal was achieved. Much helpful assistance has been provided the province advisory team by CORDS Land Reform at Region. The Province Land Affairs Service has had a difficult mission to accomplish; yet, under the fine leadership of the service chief it continues to render an especially good performance.

LABOR.

The Labor Service of An Giang Province is responsible for Chau Doc and is virtually inactive within this province.

YOUTH AFFAIRS.

In spite of the fact that it meets its goals (which really contributes little to improving interest in development of young people), "Sorry" is a good way to describe this service. It is headed by a weak and lazy chief and has produced little evidence of attempts to improve the youth activities situation. Advisory recommendations to use the PSDF as the implementing agency for youth and sports activities has gone unheeded for a year and a half. Attention to the needs of youth seems to be a preoccupation of the wealthy for the wealthy.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

Province Public Administration Services range from adequate to strong in performance of duties. The Province Training Center is efficient and meets its training goals. Yet, out-put in terms of numbers instead of knowledgeable trainees has been paramount. It is time that pursuit of quality graduates be made the primary aim of the Training Center so that village/huylet governments now struggling with the demands upon them become firmly viable and capable of tending to the needs of the people. The Taxation Service appears to be carrying out the newly promulgated tax laws and is fully capable of meeting the 1973 tax receipt quotas. The Economic and Finance Services are considered adequate to the requirements of their respective agencies. The Deputy Province Chief is efficient, intelligent and concerned with smooth functioning of the provincial government.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

Though stereotyped, the POLWAR/VIS operations have been usually effective and opportune. VIS has never regained the Madison Avenue style it demonstrated during the Lower House and Presidential election campaigns but it has continued to do a credible job within its limited capability. POLWAR units have performed well on civic action projects and keeping the people informed of government programs and special interest areas. Some attempt has been made to efficiently maximize psyops activities by combined VIS/POLWAR undertakings but much remains to be accomplished in this area.

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13. ABSTRACT